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Abstract
Taking stock of the DSF debate on value pluralism, this final contribution 
offers some (for now) concluding thoughts. It considers to which extent 
the original criticisms of the use of value pluralism by Spicer and Wagenaar 
can be maintained and which nuances should be added. Next, it discusses 
the use of philosophical concepts such as value pluralism for understanding 
administrative practice and developing administrative theory. It concludes 
this use can be considerable, provided such concepts are treated with 
sufficient carefulness.
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Debating Value Pluralism
Real, fundamental debates are rare, even among academics. We are therefore 
very grateful for the opportunity offered by the editors of Administration & 
Society to have another round of debate on value pluralism (VP) and its 
meaning for public administration. This debate, as usual, leaves something to 
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be desired in terms of unity of theme and purity of tone. Overall, however, we 
think it has been lively, instructive, revealing, and important. May disputa-
tions like this be sine fine.
This final rejoinder consists of two parts. In the first, taking stock of the 
six contributions following upon our initial article (two by Spicer, two by 
Wagenaar, one by Talisse, and one by De Graaf), we return to our original 
claims and clarify to what extent we would like to maintain or nuance them. 
Doing so, we want to be not so much judges in our own case as defendants 
offering a last word on their behalf before the readers retract to form their 
own judgment. In the second part, we will briefly attempt to state more con-
structively what, in our opinion, VP can and cannot mean for administrative 
theory and practice. Thus, we answer the challenge to relate our ideas more 
to practice, while also discussing some of the pitfalls and benefits this debate 
has revealed for the employment of philosophical theory in a practically ori-
ented field like public administration.
Back to Our Claims
Our article (Overeem & Verhoef, 2014) intended to draw attention to a 
neglected topic. We observed that, while the work of Spicer, Wagenaar, and 
of course Weber have received ample attention in public administration, 
nobody in the field had, as far as we knew, seriously assessed their explicit 
use of, indeed reliance on, VP.1 This we found remarkable given the surge of 
attention for “public values” and “public value management” our field has 
seen in recent years (Van der Wal, Nabatchi, & de Graaf, 2015; Williams & 
Shearer, 2011). Somehow, the adoption of the philosophical concept of VP 
has gone unnoticed or, what is perhaps more likely, was uncritically accepted.
In our admittedly polemical article, we made the three-pronged argument 
that “the moral prescriptions for public administration” that Spicer and 
Wagenaar derive from VP “are neither logical (they do not follow), nor 
exhaustive (other implications are also possible), nor congruent (they do not 
match to each other)” (2014, p. 1004). These were our claims; do they still 
stand?
The first point, about logical entailment, was clearly the most important of 
our claims, taking the greater part of our argument. We wanted to make clear 
that (contrary to what Spicer and Wagenaar, in our reading, do) no particular 
behavior of public administrators and no particular design of public adminis-
tration can be required simply because of VP. We feel particularly strength-
ened, after the debate, to uphold this claim. Especially Talisse’s analysis has 
made it very clear, we think, that moral and practical prescriptions simply 
cannot be logically derived from VP alone as it is commonly understood by 
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philosophers (notwithstanding the fact that, as Spicer notes, many of them 
have tried to do so).
Two nuances, however, seem in order. The first is the point, raised by 
Talisse too and indicated by the clauses “simply because” and “alone” just 
used, that certain prescriptions, although not entailed by VP itself, can be 
derived from sets of ideas of which VP is part. So when VP is combined with, 
for instance, liberal constitutionalism or a practice-oriented approach to 
administrative decision making, prescriptions can be derived from the result-
ing amalgam. But here, the add-ons do the prescriptive work, not VP. As 
Talisse aptly put it, many prescriptions that are not entailed by VP can still be 
consistent with it—including those of Spicer and Wagenaar.
Here it may be helpful to note in passing that in our article, we remained 
deliberately agnostic about the truth of VP. Whether VP is right or wrong, we 
did not and still do not clearly know. We want to assure our critics, however, 
that we do share many of the theoretical and practical commitments (other 
than VP) that they defend. So the conviction of the importance of politics and 
constitutionalism; the awareness of the imperfectibility of politics and the 
dangers of utopianism; the dislike of positivistic scientism that dominates 
present-day public administration; the insight that moral dilemmas permeate 
the daily work of public officials; the view that administrators, also in highly 
professionalized and even purely executive functions, are constantly making 
important moral judgments; the belief that this kind of work can never be 
fully grasped or managed by a set of rules—we share all these points. We 
only maintain that to hold them, one does not need to accept VP as well. As 
Talisse has made eloquently clear, a value monist can accept such positions, 
too. Indeed, one need not take any stance on the metaphysical nature of val-
ues to hold particular values dear, nor the same stance as others to hold the 
same values dear.
The second important nuance is that both Spicer and Wagenaar, pressed by 
our article, more or less deny that they ever wanted to logically derive any 
prescriptions from VP. They retort that their prescriptions came not from VP 
but from other ideas (especially Spicer) or that VP was never a starting point 
of any line of reasoning but only a description of the situation in which 
administrators find themselves (especially Wagenaar). To the extent that we 
have falsely ascribed a logical derivation mistake to them, we willingly 
acknowledge our misinterpretation of their work. Two characteristics of their 
replies prevent us from fully losing our worries, however. The first is that 
both authors continue to speak in terms of entailment. Thus, Spicer (2014) 
quotes his own statement that VP “at least implicitly for us, carries with it 
certain normative implications” (p. 1012) and Wagenaar refers to Chang’s 
(1997) volume to uphold “the relationship between value pluralism ( . . . ) 
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with practical reason,” implying there and elsewhere that because there is VP, 
administrators have to deal with it in a particular way. If not confused, such 
statements are at least confusing.
Our other, more general cause of concern is the contempt shown by our crit-
ics of logic and logical argument. Rather than absolving the logical error we 
ascribed to them or offering a clear alternative to repair it, they choose to blame 
us for suggesting their arguments were ever logical in the first place! This 
“don’t bother us with your logic” mentality we find rather disturbing. It shows 
well the positive harm that logical positivism has done to our field and indeed 
the social sciences more generally: Because of its narrow and excessive reli-
ance on logic next to empirical observation, many of its opponents have got an 
active dislike of the former if not also of the latter. This is all very unfortunate 
and unnecessary. Neither for us nor (we believe) for Talisse is logical validity 
the single criterion of good scholarship, but still we consider it one of the quali-
ties one may reasonably demand from serious theoretical work.
On our two other claims (about exhaustiveness and congruence), we can be 
brief. All authors in the debate seem to agree that many different normative 
positions, including theoretically and practically incompatible ones, can go 
together with an acceptance of VP. Such differences may to some extent be due 
to, and legitimated by, circumstances of context, as Spicer (2014) supposes 
(pp. 1016-1017), but in many arguments about VP, including those by Spicer 
and Wagenaar, contextual factors play only a limited role. Indeed, VP is pre-
sented as a general moral truth recognized by many human beings. And so it 
should probably be, because if the implications of VP can differ and change 
radically depending on the circumstances in which it is held, it is hard to see 
how VP can still be a guiding moral notion and how it differs (as its adherents 
insist it does) from sheer relativism. Hence, we believe the multiplicity of 
incompatible positions related to VP does pose a problem for its adherents. It is 
unfortunate that Wagenaar and Spicer (unlike De Graaf) carefully avoid to 
engage with each others’ (and Weber’s) very different positions.
Positive and Negative Implications
Especially Wagenaar, but also De Graaf and to a smaller extent even Spicer, 
strongly believe VP is important not only as a philosophical concept to grasp 
something of our moral situation but also as a notion to better understand 
(and perhaps improve) administrative practice. It helps in particular, they 
suggest, to understand what public officials are doing and why, and how they 
experience their work. And they blame us for severing theoretical argument 
from administrative reality, ending up in sterile logical exercises without 
practical import, contributing nothing to the handling of concrete problems 
faced by administrators.
 at Universiteit Leiden \ LUMC on October 12, 2015aas.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
Overeem and Verhoef 1107
To these rather unfair charges (expressing a no less exclusivist understand-
ing of “proper” administrative theory than the position mistakenly ascribed to 
us), we would like to respond with a very concrete and important example: the 
trade-off, which has been and still has to be made by many governments in the 
world, especially since 9/11, between security and privacy. This is of course a 
major issue that is experienced as a genuine value conflict in many ways and 
on many levels of government. Should governments be allowed to intrude 
upon the privacy of their own citizens and of foreigners, however innocent, by 
gathering data from email, phone calls, and other forms of communication to 
avert terrorist threats and prevent possible attacks? For politicians deciding 
upon legislation, and for intelligence officers working in this field, this is a 
recurring practical and morally laden question. It also seems a clear dilemma: 
On this issue, choosing more of one value inevitably means having less of the 
other, and there is no way to go around that.
Do we need the concept of VP to recognize and understand the value con-
flict here? Clearly not. As Talisse explains, the recognition (and experience) 
of a moral dilemma like this one is not something only value pluralists can 
have. Value monists such as Plato, Kant, Mill, and Dworkin, were they still 
alive, could also very well see and feel it. There is also no need to believe that 
security and privacy are incommensurable values. The whole dilemma seems 
not intrinsic to the values concerned but highly contingent upon an external 
factor, namely, the existence of dangerous terrorists who operate in a covert 
way. Would that somehow no longer be the case, the dilemma would imme-
diately disappear. And so it is with many pressing dilemmas in political and 
administrative life.
What lessons can be drawn from our debate on VP for the wider topic of 
the use of philosophical theory in public administration? One thing we think 
we can readily agree upon is that arguments from authority—to the use of 
which we are all tempted—will not do. So the fact that Machiavelli and 
Weber, Berlin and Williams, Dewey and Rorty, or other respected authors did 
or did not endorse VP does not by itself demonstrate its truth. And the fact that 
one’s opponent’s premises “are contested by respected scholars within his 
own field” (Spicer, 2015) is no argument against those premises themselves. 
We should, in the famous words ascribed to Aristotle, love Plato but love 
truth more. Appeals to luminaries in the philosophical tradition can of course 
be made to clarify the terms of a substantive debate, as we have ourselves 
tried to do by our elaboration of Berlin’s conceptualization of VP, but never 
to settle such a debate.
But philosophy can contribute more to administrative theory than mere 
conceptual clarification. As Spicer rightly notes (2015), philosophical reflec-
tion and argumentation can raise our awareness and understanding 
of a special kind of intractable problems that we would not see or grasp 
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otherwise—“philosophical questions ( . . . ) that, in the final analysis, cannot 
be settled by the methods of either science or logic.” Contrary to the impres-
sion our initial article may have given, we fully acknowledge the existence 
and importance of such questions. Indeed, we think questions about the 
nature, (in)compatibility, and (in)commensurability of values are precisely of 
this kind. In this sense, as we noted at the end of our initial article, the concept 
of VP is highly important for diagnostic purposes. The VP thesis can (even if 
metaphysically untrue!) help raise our awareness of the “moral scarcity” that 
seems to characterize the world we inhibit. In this limited respect we agree 
with De Graaf (2015), that VP, although prescriptively barren, can be “highly 
relevant for administrative practice.” To say, however, that our moral situa-
tion should be ameliorated in a particular way, or even to evaluate it as prob-
lematic, is something that VP, on its own, does not entail.
The imprecise use of VP by prominent administrative theorists and the uncriti-
cal acceptance of that use by the wider public administration community is, we 
think, somewhat symptomatic for our field as a whole. While aspiring to be inter-
disciplinary, it is still quite eclectic; interesting ideas and findings from other 
fields are imported, used, and occasionally showcased, but too often not fully 
integrated or even grasped. This is not only the case for contributions from phi-
losophy but also for those from much closer disciplines like law, management 
studies (and economics), and even political science (Wright, 2011). Ideas from 
philosophy, however, are especially vulnerable to sloppy use and even abuse, 
because philosophy is less known to most public administration colleagues than 
the other fields mentioned and because philosophical ideas are often taken as 
more malleable than seemingly “harder” findings from those fields.
This is not to deny that (moral) philosophy can be fruitfully connected to 
the practically oriented field of public administration. Here we fully concur 
with Spicer, who has claimed before and does so again in this volume, that 
philosophy is indeed of crucial importance to administrative scholarship and 
practice. It should, however, be resorted to with greater carefulness and, 
indeed, more logical validity than has been done so far in the writings on VP 
that we have criticized. If not, the field of public administration might fall 
victim to its own Sokal hoax.
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Note
1. The relationship between Weber’s political and administrative theory, on the one 
hand, and his value pluralism (avant la lettre), on the other, is, however, rather 
implicit and unclear (but see Spicer, 2015a).
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